Chinese Cities - Sciences Po - OGLM 3050 - 59127 - S2 2025/26 Clément Renaud [hi@clementrenaud.com](mailto:hi@clementrenaud.com) (use left/right keyboard arrows to navigate) --- class: inverse, center, middle ## Week 2 # 地 ## Land: Governance And Territorial Reforms #### 3 Feb 2026 --- class: inverse, center, middle ## Character of the week # 地 [Purple Culture](https://www.purpleculture.net/dictionary-details/?word=地) / [Hanziyuan](https://hanziyuan.net/) / [CUHK dic](https://humanum.arts.cuhk.edu.hk/Lexis/lexi-mf/search.php?word=地) --- class: inverse # What we will cover today - the Made in China assignment: methodology and objectives - land reform in China (since 1950s) - land rights and urban development - land leasing and financing (LGVF) --- # "Made in China" assignment - individual - due week 6 - read the [assignment](/chinese-cities/assignement-made-in-china) [https://clementrenaud.com/chinese-cities/assignement-made-in-china](https://clementrenaud.com/chinese-cities/assignement-made-in-china) --- # Biography of things ### Why focus on objects? study objects to understand organisations: the "material turn" (Actor-Network Theory) > Technology is society made durable. .small[Strum, Callon, Latour & Akrich (2013). _Sociologie de la traduction: Textes fondateurs_, p.290] Objects and materials acquire significance through interactions with people, cultures, periods. > "objects like persons, have social lives" .small[_The social life of things - Appadurai (2014)_] Concept of "boundary objects" — where do _things_ end? --- # Biography of things ### Kopytoff (1986) - What are the 'biographical possibilities' of the object? Its perfect career? - Define the scope: what is the unit of your study? - Focus on sites of transformations: where was it made, sold/bought/acquired, consumed/owned/used, stored, discarded, recycled, etc. - Chain analysis - ex. [Hulme, 2015](https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003086215), [Lepawsky, 2010](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1541-0064.2009.00279.x) - Circuit of meanings: How is it represented? What identities are associated with it? How is it produced? How is it consumed? How is it regulated? --- # Biography of things ## Other methodological approaches ### See [(Woodward, 2019)](https://methods.sagepub.com/book/mono/material-methods/toc) - **Archaeology**: inventory, description, categorization — [Shanzhai Archaeology](https://we-make-money-not-art.com/shanzhai-archeology-defying-our-standardized-technological-imagination/) - **Interviews**: talk about things (unique biographies) - [Selfie stick](https://journals.openedition.org/tc/8476) - **Art/design methods**: cultural probes, prototypes, collage — [Near Future Lab](https://shop.nearfuturelaboratory.com/products/self-driving-geneva) - **Ethnography** (multi-site) — VIPOMAR --- # What Is to Be Done? .two-cols[ ### 1. Description Describe the object in its different spaces (in China / elsewhere) ### 2. Map Identify "sites of transformations" ### 3. Document Add visual / cultural elements ### 4. Analysis Narrative about the _Made in China_ trajectory What you have learned ### 5. Discussion Possible future trajectories ### 6. Methodology Say a word about _how_ you did it ] --- class: middle, center, inverse # Land reform in China ### (1949-2025) --- class: middle # Quick Timeline - **Imperial & Republican Land Ownership** (pre-1947) - **Early Communist Experiments** (1930s-1947) - **Collectivization** (1949-1957) - **Great Leap Forward** (1958-1960) - **People's Communes** (1960-1978) - **End of collectivization** (1978-1984) - **Economic reforms** (1980s-1990s) - **Land conversion and country-scale urbanisation** (1990s-today) --- # Before 1949 Imperial & Republican Era (Republic of China) - Feudal warlords controlled much of the land - Tenancy was prevalent Early days of the _People’s Republic of China_ - Goal is the redistribution of land / elimination of landlord class - Yan'an (Shaanxi): HQ of CCP (1935-1947) — [Long March](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Long_March#/media/File:Map_of_the_Long_March_1934-1935-en.svg) > "rent reduction must be the result of mass struggle, not a favor from government. Only then can we persuade the masses and enable them to understand that it is in their interests as a whole to allow the landlords to make a living so that they will not help the GMD. The present policy of our party is still to reduce rents, not confiscate land." Selected works of Mao Tse-tung, 1945 --- class: middle, center, inverse # Socialist Era Land Reforms ### (1949-1980s) --- class: inverse background-image: url(/chinese-cities/img/mutual-aid-teams.jpg) .inverse[ # Collectivization (1949-1957) ] --- # Why Collectivization? .two-cols[ ### Economic goals - Increase agricultural productivity through economies of scale - Modernize farming practices ### Political goals - Eliminate landlord class and consolidate state power - Break traditional rural power structures - Create new social organization ### Ideological goals - Socialist transformation of rural society - Move toward collective ownership - Soviet model influence ### Connection to industrialization - Agriculture would fund heavy industry - Rural labor would support urban development ] --- # Three Stages of Collectivization | Stage | Households Involved | Key Features | Participation/Ownership | Income Distribution | |----------------------------------------|------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------| | **1. Mutual Aid Teams** | 5-6 households | Seasonal sharing of equipment and labor | Voluntary, 40% joined by 1952 | N/A | | **2. Agricultural Producer's Cooperatives** | 30-50 families (part or whole village) | Permanent sharing of equipment and labor; 'land-share, labor-share' (common land pool but retains private ownership) | Voluntary, private land ownership retained. By 1956, 96% of rural families were organized into collectives. | Point system based on input to determine income | | **3. Advanced Cooperatives** | 150-200 households | Land became cooperative property; no longer voluntary | Collective ownership, not voluntary | Based on needs and labor contribution| --- # Collectivization at work .two-cols[  - From 1953-1957 grain production increased 3.5% each year. - Only 8% of state investment was towards agriculture (Heavy Industry = 85% of investment) - Payment System: Time-rate method, also based on age, sex, physical strength, farming skills and how hard one is working ### In cities - Danwei started to be built (1953) - see [architectural comparison](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-981-15-6811-4_2) ] .footnote[[image source](http://www.commonprogram.science/art29.html)] --- background-image: url(https://laurenream.github.io/culturalrevolution/images/backyardfurnace2000x817.jpg) # Great Leap Forward (1958-1960) - 1956: A Hundred Flowers Bloom (de-stalinization of USSR; Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin shocked Mao) - 1957: anti-rightist campaign .footnote[ - 1958 GLF: Unrealistic production goals - Attempt to move industry to countryside - Food shortages (caused by inflated production stats) - Weather unfavorable 1959-1961 ] --- # People's commune (人民公社) Peak collectivitism 1958 to 1983 : highest rural admin divisions (4-5000 to 20 000 households) - During GLF, private plots of land and private markets were eliminated - The labor force was reorganized into work crews for large projects — e.g. water conservation (irrigation) or local industry, infrastructure building, etc. - Hukou is signed into law (administratively tying paesants to their land) - Ideological warfare: four Clean-ups (四清運動) then Cultural Revolution - 上山下乡运动 (Up to the Mountains and Down to the Countryside Movement) --- class: inverse background-image: url(/chinese-cities/img/dxp-billboard-quote-sz.webp) # The End of collectivization (1978-1984) --- # The End of Collectivization (1978-1984) .two-cols[ ### Economic crisis of late 1970s - Agricultural productivity stagnated - Food shortages and rural poverty - Inefficiency of collective farming ### Political change - Deng Xiaoping era begins (1978) - Shift from class struggle to economic development - New "Basic line of the Party" ### Experiments and success - 1978: _xiaogang_ in Anhui province ([小岗村](https://topics.gmw.cn/2021-08/25/content_35111096.htm)) - Farmers allowed to keep surplus after meeting quotas - Immediate productivity gains ### Connection to broader reform - Part of "Reform and Opening" (改革开放) - Set stage for market-oriented reforms - Enabled rural surplus labor for urban development ] --- # Gradual land rights reform - People's Commune divided into private plots - the Household Responsibility System (HRS) replaced the people’s commune system as the main rural land institution. - collectively owned land was contracted to individual households. - over time, contract rights have gradually matured into quasi-property rights, with contracts extending from 15 years toward “permanency” (长久不变) Agriculture - farmers get to keep land's output (after taxes) - Two Land System: Total cultivated land divided into two parts: food land & contract land --- class: middle, center, inverse # Post-1980s: State-Led Urbanization ### Land conversion and territorial governance --- # Partial Reform Strategy ### New legal foundations - **1982 Constitution**: Abolished private land ownership; established dual ownership (state/collective) - **1988 Reform**: Sequential approach — urban land reform first, rural later - **Shenzhen experiment** (1979-1987): First land use fees, then first public auction (Dec 1, 1987) ### Separation of land use rights (使用权) from ownership - **1988 Constitutional Amendment**: Legalized transfer of land use rights .footnote[ Qiao, Shitong. _Chinese Small Property: The Co-Evolution of Law and Social Norms._ Cambridge University Press, 2017. [Excerpt](https://assets.cambridge.org/97811071/76232/excerpt/9781107176232_excerpt.pdf) ] --- class: title # China's Dual Land Ownership System ## State owns all land. No private land ownership in China (宪法规定 - 1982 constitutional provision ) .two-cols[ ### Rural land: collective ownership - 村集体所有 (village collective ownership) - Villages and peasants have use rights (承包权), not ownership - Cannot sell land directly to developers ### Urban land: state ownership - 国有 (state ownership) - State grants use rights through leases - 70-year leases for residential, 40-50 years for commercial ] --- # Land reclassification system ## Only the state can convert rural to urban land ### peasants can't sell directly - They don't own the land, only use rights (使用权) - Must go through government for conversion - This creates the monopoly on land conversion ### Consequences - Local governments = biggest beneficiaries of land sales revenue - Vested interests that resist further rural land reform - Land sales revenue became major source of local government finance (up to 50% in some cities) - Farmers have limited voice in policy-making process --- # Government structure see [Structure here](https://assets.cambridge.org/97811071/76232/excerpt/9781107176232_excerpt.pdf)  .footnote[ source: https://journals.openedition.org/cybergeo/28554 ] --- background-image: url(/chinese-cities/img/hukou_booklet.png) # The Hukou system ## Rural VS urban hukou - very ancient system of household registration - formalized administrative rules to regulate agriculture - 1958: Hukou is signed into law --- # 1994 Fiscal Reform: The Turning Point .two-cols[ ### Tax-sharing system (分税制) - new Value-added tax (VAT) split: 75% central, 25% local - Local governments lost major revenue sources ### Fiscal pressure on municipalities - Local governments still responsible for: - Education, healthcare, infrastructure - Urban development and services - But with reduced tax revenue ### Need for new revenue streams - 下岗 (xiàgǎng) — large manufacturing SOEs closing down - Land leasing emerged as funding solution - Land transfer fees became major revenue source ### Land-driven urbanization - Land became "cash cow" for local governments - Created incentive for aggressive land conversion - Set stage for land-driven urbanization model ] --- # Land reclassification rural > urban - all land use submitted to quotas locally and nationally (industrial / commercial / arable) - goal is to "save" land by transforming "hollow" villages into dense urban areas - subnational gov have monopoly on land conversion (no direct deal between villagers and developers) - arable land with sparse villages > reclassified as urban land (value goes up) - peasants trade their land for urban hukou with "benefits" ### Two main stages (90s /00s) - 1990s: industrial land development (开发区) dominates - since 2002, high taxes on 开发区 (70% goes to central gov) - 00s: switch to "new cities" 新城 --- .left-column[ ### Administrative structure - **Planning bureaus** (规划局): urban planning and land use - **Land bureaus** (国土局): land administration and conversion - Coordination between different government levels ### Legal framework - Land Administration Law (土地管理法) - Urban Planning Law (城市规划法) - Regulations on land use rights transfer ### Land quotas system (用地指标) - National quotas allocated to provinces - Provinces allocate to cities/counties - Quotas for different land types: industrial, commercial, residential, arable - Connection to Five-Year Plans ] .right-column[ # How it Works: The Process ### Approval process - Local government proposes conversion - Provincial approval required - National approval for large-scale projects - Decision-making hierarchy: county → prefecture → province → central ### Build the project - SOEs or Real Estate Developer - Bargain with peasants ] --- # The Landless Peasants (失地农民) - peasants start to cede land-use rights against urban Hukou (new housing / social welfare) - Urban hukou = access to urban services (education, healthcare, social welfare, employment, etc) - Status and social mobility ### Typical compensation components - **Cash payments**: calculated per mu (亩, ~667 m²) - **Housing allocation**: resettlement housing (安置房) - **Social welfare benefits**: healthcare, pension contributions - **Employment opportunities**: jobs in new developments .footnote[Ong, Lynette H. “State-Led Urbanization in China: Skyscrapers, Land Revenue and ‘Concentrated Villages.’” The China Quarterly 217 (March 2014): 162–79.] --- # Compensation deals varies greatly - No national standard until recently (2019 law) - Local governments negotiate individually - Depends on land value, development potential - Corruption and local power dynamics - Tier 1 cities vs. smaller cities, coastal vs. inland, #### Iconic case of the Wukan Village — [watch "Lost Course" trailer](https://www.imdb.com/video/vi4217159705/?playlistId=tt13236440&ref_=tt_ov_pr_ov_vi)  --- background-image: url(/chinese-cities/img/dingzihu.jpg) # Nail Houses 钉子户 - holdout - [image gallery](https://www.theguardian.com/cities/gallery/2014/apr/15/china-nail-houses-in-pictures-property-development) - [Chongqing](https://www.reddit.com/r/UrbanHell/comments/196wuly/nail_building_in_chongqing/#lightbox) example - [Wu Ping](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wu_Ping) in CQ - 正升·百老汇广场 --- # Social Impact: Life After Land Loss .two-cols[ ### What happens to peasants after losing land - Loss of livelihood and traditional way of life - No longer farmers, but not fully urban either - Identity crisis and social dislocation ### Displacement and resettlement challenges - Forced relocation to resettlement housing - Often far from original location - Loss of social networks and community - Adaptation to urban lifestyle ### Urban adaptation difficulties - Lack of skills for urban employment - Limited education and training - Dependence on compensation money - Generational gap: older generation struggles more ### Generational impacts - Children may benefit from urban education - But parents lose economic security - Intergenerational wealth transfer disrupted - Some families prosper, others struggle ### Gender dimensions - Women often lose land rights in resettlement - Traditional inheritance patterns disrupted - Women's economic security reduced - Gender inequality in compensation ### Creation of "landless peasants" class - 失地农民 (shīdì nóngmín): new social category - No land, limited urban integration - Social tensions and conflicts - Connection to Wukan case and other protests ] ---  .footnote[ [img source](https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/environmental-science/articles/10.3389/fenvs.2022.1065174/full) ] --- class: middle, center, inverse # Financing Urban Development ### LGFVs, debt, and outcomes --- # Local Government Financing Vehicle (LGFV) ### What is it? - Company created by local government to finance urban development - China has more than 10,000+ LGFVs - Created because local governments can't borrow directly (legally) - Circumvents borrowing restrictions through off-balance-sheet financing ### Examples - [LGFV examples in Guizhou province](https://www.readwriteinvest.com/p/project-finance-with-kweichow-characteristics) - Different [kinds of bonds](https://www.echo-wall.eu/inside-china/off/local-debts-top-level-design) - Not all successful — some lose money, become ghost towns --- # How LGFVs Work ### The mechanism 1. Local government creates LGFV company 2. Rezone rural land into urban land 3. Bundle land as collateral, sell bonds to China Development Bank (CDB) 4. CDB provides financing to LGFV 5. LGFV develops infrastructure or sells land rights to developers 6. Developers build housing, sell to urban residents ### Context - 2008: 4 trillion RMB stimulus (~1/3 went to urban infrastructure) - After 2005: "land transfer fee" replaced "borrowing" in budgets - Land as collateral for loans --- # Ghost Cities: Visible Consequence - Mostly districts, not entire cities - Examples: Kang Bashi (Ordos), Tianducheng (Fake Paris) ### Connection to LGFV model - **Build now, pay later**: LGFVs build infrastructure to increase land value - Sell land to developers → developers build housing → population should follow - Sometimes population doesn't follow → ghost cities ### Not all failures - **Success**: Pudong (Shanghai) was "ghost" in 1990s, now thriving - **Mixed**: Some districts take 5-10 years to populate - **Failures**: Overbuilding, poor location, miscalculated demand .footnote[ ["unborn" cities](https://kaimichael.com/unborn-cities) | [China Perspectives](https://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/7209) | [Nature article](https://www.nature.com/articles/s44284-024-00177-8) ] --- # LGFV: Systemic Risks ### Scale of debt - Total LGFV debt: 50-60 trillion RMB (2023) ≈ 40-50% of GDP - Rapid growth since 2008 stimulus ### Debt accumulates - Off-balance-sheet borrowing (not on government books) - Land values may not cover debt - Shadow banking connection: trust companies, wealth management products. ### Risks - Some LGFVs default (especially in smaller cities) - Real estate bubble - Local government fiscal sustainability --- # Policy Responses ### 2014-2015: Debt swap programs - Convert LGFV debt to government bonds - Reduce interest costs, extend repayment periods ### 2017: Stricter regulations - Limits on new LGFV debt. Tighter oversight of operations ### 2020s: "Three Red Lines" for real estate - Limits on debt ratios for property developers - Reduced financing for real estate → impact on LGFV land sales ### Ongoing challenges - Local governments still need revenue. Debt remains high - Balancing control vs. development needs --- <!-- # Case Study: Chongqing Bo Xilai (薄熙来) [https://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/5749](https://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/5749) [https://www.spgchinaratings.cn/insights/articles/commentary_chongqing-lgfvs_21may2020_en.pdf](https://www.spgchinaratings.cn/insights/articles/commentary_chongqing-lgfvs_21may2020_en.pdf) [https://www.moodys.com/researchandratings/region/asia-pacific/china/0420C8/00500001D](https://www.moodys.com/researchandratings/region/asia-pacific/china/0420C8/00500001D) [https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S026483771730730](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0264837717307305) [5](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0264837717307305) --> --- .col-one-half[ ### 80s : Get rich or die tryin' Yuen Yuen Ang - experimenting with capitalism - the Special Economic Zones - allowing FDIs - employment restructuring (from national to open markets) - [stats](https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2002/08/art3full.pdf) ] .col-one-half[  ]